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Abstract—The concept of a common operational picture
has been utilized by the military for situational awareness
in warfare domains for many years. With the emergence of
cyberspace as a domain, there is a necessity to develop doctrine
and tools to enable situational awareness for key-decision
makers. Our study analyzes key elements that define cyber
situational awareness to develop a methodology to identify
assets within key cyber terrain, thus enabling situational
awareness at the tactical level. For the purposes of this work,
we treat critical assets to be key cyber terrain, given that
no formal study has determined differences between asset
criticality and key cyber terrain. Mission- and operationally-
based questions are investigated to identify critical assets with
the TOPSIS methodology. Results show that the ICS system
can be evaluated using TOPSIS to identify critical assets
contributing to key cyber terrain, enabling further research
into other interconnected systems.
Keywords-key cyber terrain, cyber situational awareness,
MADM, TOPSIS, industrial control system, cyber physical
systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the cyber warfare domain, the development of a com-
mon operational picture is necessary for the war fighter
to appropriately deploy defensive countermeasures and of-
fensive capabilities. Without situational awareness, the war
fighter may make suboptimal decisions that will put peo-
ple and equipment at risk. Current capabilities for cyber
situational awareness are limited to network defense op-
erations, such as intrusion detection, attack trend analysis,
information flow analysis, damage assessment, and intrusion
response [1]. To accurately attain cyber situational aware-
ness, one must identify critical assets with respect to the
mission and their importance to that mission. The criticality
of individual assets and the relationship between assets
describe the key cyber train for a given mission. Without
identification of key cyber terrain, the war fighter suffers
from reduced situational awareness and a diminished ability
to defend and operate in the cyber domain.
Part of the difficulty in identifying critical assets in the
cyber domain is in the dual logical and physical abstractions
of the domain, the deep technical requirements for assessing
asset behavior in a contested environment and the domain’s
complexity due to the growth of individual technologies
into systems-of-systems [1]. Without asset or event filtering,
interpreting the volume of data itself poses a deep technical
challenge [2].
In support of this goal, our study validates an existing
methodology for analyzing cyber asset criticality to deter-
mine key cyber terrain in the context of a non-trivial case
study: a reconfigurable, shipboard industrial control system
in use by the US Navy. We employ a hierarchical variant
of TOPSIS, a multi-attribute decision making (MADM)
strategy selected by Kim and Kang [3] as promising for
defining cyber asset criticality. Our main contributions are
as follows:
- We employ hierarchical TOPSIS in a complex setting,
using the analytical hierarchy process for deriving
weights for use in TOPSIS, exploring its distinguisha-
bility and sensitivity with respect to SME input;
- We “fill in the gap” for operationalizing this method-
ology, including defining cybersecurity criteria, decom-
posing a complex system into families and identifying
missions;
- We explore criticality and key cyber terrain for a cyber-
physical system for insight at the tactical level, whereas
prior work focuses primarily on IT assets and the
operational/strategic levels;
- We demonstrate that, as suspected, asset criticality is
mission-dependent and contextual;
- In the context of our study, we find that weighting
assets in relative importance to a mission plays a
more important role in identifying cyber key terrain
than ranking the relative importance of cybersecurity
criteria.
Organization: In Sec. II, we discuss background and re-
lated work on identification of key cyber terrain. In Sec. III,
we outline the methodology employed for our case study, a
hierarchical variant of TOPSIS. In Sec. IV, we discuss the
missions, criteria and assets of our case study. In Sec. V, we
outline the factors explored in our case study and the results
of our analysis. In Sec. VI, we conclude and discuss future
work.
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II. BACKGROUND
The US Navy has prioritized the identification of key
cyber terrain and cyber situational awareness in U.S. Fleet
Cyber Command / Tenth Fleet: Strategic Plan 2015–2020.
In particular, its Strategic Initiative 1.1 focuses the effort by
stating:
For each network . . . and for each mission, we
will 1) define key terrain, 2) identify or define
operational availability (Ao) for that terrain, and
3) track how well we maintain Ao. This increased
understanding will ensure we can successfully de-
fend and fight through those key— and sometimes
decisive— terrains. [4]
In our work, we treat asset crticiality as the sole measureable
factor contributing to key cyber terrain. In the absence
of work more concretely characterizing the relationship
between these, we believe this is appropriate. We discuss
existing efforts to describe key cyber terrain, analysis meth-
ods of determining critical cyber assets and related work.
A. Key Cyber Terrain
Traditionally, key terrain is defined as “any locality, or
area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked
advantage to either combatant” [5]. In the cyber domain, key
terrain involves network links and nodes that are essential
to both friendly and adversarial forces [6]. What constitutes
key cyber terrain has been disputed [7]–[11], but Franz
[11] defines it as “the physical and logical elements of the
[cyber] domain that enable mission essential war fighting
functions; is temporal; . . . and is applicable across strategic,
operational, and tactical levels of war”.
Raymond et al. [10] propose a framework for character-
izing cyber terrain along the following planes: supervisory,
cyber persona, logical, physical, and geographic. This frame-
work partially aligns with DoD Joint Publication 3-12(R) [6]
which depicts cyberspace into the three layers: the physical
network layer, the logical network layer, and the cyber
persona layer. While there are differences in identification
of cyber domain planes, the two extra planes proposed by
Raymond provide the ability to highlight command and
control of cyber operations (supervisory plane) and tie in
kinetic operations (geographical plane).
Jakobson [12] argues that key cyber terrain is made up
of cyber assets and services, and their intra- and inter-
dependencies. Cyber terrain is identified by focusing more
on dependencies within a system vice across planes and
is defined as three separate sub-terrains: hardware, which
consists of a collection of connected network infrastructure
components, like routers, servers, switches, communication
lines, etc., and dependencies between them; software, which
consists of different software components, such as operating
systems and applications; and service, which represents all
the services, such as database, file transfer, email, security
services, etc., and their intra-dependencies [12].
Regardless of the framework or model utilized to identify
key cyber terrain, a commonality in determining key cyber
terrain is determining critical assets. MITRE emphasizes the
importance of critical assets to key cyber terrain stating that
“assets in operational environments are typically identified
and their criticality determined via a mission impact analysis
or business impact analysis” [8]. Dressler et al. [13] broaden
the identification of key cyber terrain to include “all critical
information, systems, and infrastructure; whether owned by
the organization or used in transit by its information”. From
Franz’ definition of key cyber terrain, MITRE and Dressler’s
discussions of critical assets as part of key cyber terrain tie
directly into “mission essential war fighting functions” [11].
B. Asset Criticality
There is debate about the best method to determine
asset criticality. Three proposed methodologies are attack
graphs, Bayesian networks and multi-attribute decision mak-
ing (MADM). Attack graphs are mathematical depictions of
possible vectors of attacks against a specific network [14].
They can detail “all possible sequences of vulnerabilities an
attacker can follow,” or “with a monotonicity assumption
stating an attacker never relinquishes an obtained capability,
an attack graph can record the dependency relationships
among vulnerabilities” [15]. Attack graphs are limited in
that they quickly become complicated and require computer
modeling, even for small networks [16]. Bayesian networks
are graphical representations of probabilistic relationships
within a network domain that can be constructed from attack
graphs. They are limited by only accounting for a single
actor and the assumed choices that the particular actor will
make. If the assumed choices are incorrect, then a new
Bayesian network is needed [17]. While these methods have
value in looking at criticality from the attacker perspective or
from the dependency aspect of asset criticality, MADM pro-
vides mature and well-understood multi-discipline methods
for selecting the best decision among all feasible alterna-
tives [3].
C. Related Work
Endsley originally proposed three key aspects for situa-
tional awareness [18], recently re-interpreted for the cyber
domain by MITRE [19] as a framework comprised of
network awareness (asset and configuration management),
threat awareness (identifying incidents and suspicious behav-
ior) and mission awareness (critical dependencies, real-time
response, risk assessments and informed defense planning).
MITRE’s analysis focuses on the first two of these aspects,
leaving the third area to human analysis. Our study is
in the mission-centric analysis of cyber asset criticality
and asset interdependencies, aiding the human analyst to
prioritize assets for situational awareness. Jajodia et al. [20]
reinforce both MITRE’s and Endsley’s work, observing that
to “protect critical network infrastructures and missions,
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we must understand not only the vulnerabilities of each
individual system, but also their interdependencies and how
they support missions” [20].
Several projects within the US Department of Defense
seek to map cyber networks in a mission-centric manner—
interpreting alarms and logs, monitoring processes, curat-
ing known vulnerabilities and SME input—with the goal
of improving situational awareness. Schultz et al. survey
these, calling them cyber network mission dependencies,
or mission mapping [21]. Our apporach is complimentary
to all of these, as every individual analysis methodology
is insufficient in some aspect and most agree, ultimately, a
hybrid approach is required for a comprehensive tool. In the
terminology of Schultz et al., our methodology is a process-
driven analysis as opposed to an artifact-driven analysis.
Our approach, however, differs from existing process-driven
analyses in terms of methodology and, thus, may provide
useful cross-validation of their criticality determination or,
otherwise, enhancing its coverage.
MIT Lincoln Lab’s AMMO project uses SMEs to iden-
tify an initial set of assets comprising key cyber terrain
and leverages network scanning increase terrain coverage.
MITRE’s CMIA project uses business modeling tools and
uses SMEs to map assets to that model, to assess the impact
of attacks to mission workflow during the system’s design
phase. MITRE’s RiskMAP project employs a dependency-
based analysis using SME input to model missions as a
tasks and subtasks, for assessing the impact of attacks in
disrupting mission goals in terms of availability, integrity
and (unlike most network mapping tools) confidentiality.
Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab’s Dagger project is
another dependency-based modeling tool using manual SME
input to interpret impacts of cyber effects to missions. Unlike
these tools, we employ a MADM methodology rather than a
dependency-based analysis, the latter being a type of graph-
based analysis. Criteria and asset weighting in MADM also
permits a more flexible mechanism for incorporating SME
judgement and asset inter-relationships, compared to explicit
flow-based or dependency-based analysis.
III. METHODOLOGY
Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal
Solution (TOPSIS) is a MADM method that selects the best
feasible alternative as the one closest to an ideal solution
and farthest from the negative ideal solution. TOPSIS re-
quires alternatives to have attributes which are monotoni-
cally increasing or decreasing, where all best attribute values
comprise the ideal (zenith) solution and all worst values
comprise the negative-ideal (nadir). We define a hierarchal
variant of TOPSIS for a re-configurable system, S, relative
to mission, M , given the following:
• attributes (criteria) x1, . . . , xn
• alternatives (assets) A1, . . . , Am
• score of Ai for attribute xj is rij
• weight wj for attribute xj .
The goal is to find alternative Ai closest to zenith A∗ and
farthest from nadir A−. Alternatives are grouped within a set
of families for a particular mission (see Fig. 1). The scoring
communicates the importance of that alternative within the
mission as it pertains to each family. The criticality score
for a given alternative is based on the highest score for the
alternative over all the families.
M
F1 F2 Fk. . .
A1 A2 Am. . .
score(Am, F2) = ⇣1
score(. . .) = . . .
score(A2, F2) =  1
score(A2, Fk) =  2
score(. . .) = . . .
score(A1, F1) = ⌘1
score(A1, F2) = ⌘2
score(. . .) = . . .
Figure 1. Scoring system assets based on attribute weights and allocation
to families, relative to mission M .
A. Criteria Weighting
Feedback to weight attributes is solicited from experts,
normalized and combined to get an overall weight following
the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). AHP allows “all
important tangible and intangible, quantitatively measurable,
and qualitative factors” to be included and measured [22].
We (i) solicit data to weight families (i.e., subsystems) with
respect to each mission, (ii) solicit data to weight criteria
irrespective of mission, (iii) solicit data to score each asset
irrespective of mission and (iv) derive weights for criteria
with respect to assets in a mission. The data is solicited from
subject matter experts (SMEs) who have expert familiarity
with the system and experience operating its subsystems.
The system S is broken up into two or more hierarchical
layers. For complex systems, division of S into parts reduces
the need to gather feedback on weighting criteria per asset
in each mission.
The system S is broken into subsystem component fami-
lies F1, . . . , Fk. For each subsystem F` there is an associated
set of assets, {A`,1, . . . , A`,m} ⊆ {A1, . . . , Am}. SMEs
provide pair-wise comparisons among families expressing
the relative importance of each to mission M . These com-
parisons are normalized via the eigenvector method (see
Sec. III-B). This yields a set of normalized subsystem
weights, wa1 , . . . , wak , where wa` is the weight for sub-
system F`.
Independently, attributes, x1, . . . , xn, are pair-wise com-
pared by criteria subject matter experts with respect to their
importance to system S irrespective of mission M . The
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outcome of this process is a set of normalized attribute
weights, wb1 , . . . , wbn , where wbj is the weight for criteria
xj .
Finally, weights for scoring the attributes A`,1, . . . , A`,m
under subsystem F` are derived by multiplying subsys-
tem weight wa` by criteria weights wbj , yielding weights
w`,1, . . . , w`,n for assets in subsystem F` during mission
M . Concretely, for F` with ` ∈ [1, k], this is given by:
wa` (wb1 , . . . , wbn) = (w`,1, . . . , w`,n)
This relationship between weights within AHP is depicted
in Fig. 2.
M
F1 F2 Fk. . .
. . .x1 x2 xn
wa1 wa2 wak
wb1 wb2 wbn
Figure 2. The role of weightings in the Analytical Hierarchy Process with
subsystems and criteria.
B. Weighting Normalization
The eigenvector method allows for inconsistencies within
pair-wise comparisons to be accounted for [22], [23]. The
accomodated of matrix X is a non-null vector w such
that Xw = λw and leaves w fixed. Accordingly, w is an
eigenvector if it is a non-zero solution of (X − λI)w = 0
for some λ. For an ideal solution with known weights, λ
would be equal to the number of components n. This effect
means that small variations within X are accounted for by
keeping λmax, the largest eigenvalue, close to n and the
remaining eigenvalues close to zero [22, Ch. II, §5.1].
Next, we describe normalization in reference to attribute
weights wb1 , . . . , wbn , but the process is the same for
subsystem weights wa1 , . . . , wak . First, the input weights
wb1 , . . . , wbn are normalized to have the property
n∑
j=1
wbj = 1. (1)
Next, we construct the reciprocal matrix X using the
respondent’s pair-wise comparison ratings, elicited via the
AHP:
X =

x1/x1 x1/x2 · · · x1/xn
x2/x1 x2/x2 · · · x2/xn
...
...
. . .
...
xn/x1 xn/x2 · · · xn/xn
 . (2)
When multiplied by w = (wb1 , . . . , wbn), the reciprocal
matrix obeys the equation
(X − nI)w = 0
since
X w =

1 x1/x2 · · · x1/xn
x2/x1 1 · · · x2/xn
...
...
. . .
...
xn/x1 xn/x2 · · · 1


wb1
wb2
...
wbn
 = nI w.
Note, however, that X is not an exact measurement. Thus,
we find the max eigenvalue, λmax, for the characteristic
equation using:
det(X − λI) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1− λ x1/x2 . . . x1/xn
x2/x1 1− λ . . . x2/xn
...
...
. . .
...
xn/x1 xn/x2 . . . 1− λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0.
Using λmax, and given that the sum of the weights is one
(see Eq. 1), the final weights w can found by solving the
following homogenous system [23, Ch. 3]:
1− λmax x1/x2 . . . x1/xn
x2/x1 1− λmax . . . x2/xn
...
...
. . .
...
xn/x1 xn/x2 . . . 1− λmax


wb1
wb2
...
wbn
 = 0.
C. Alternatives Selection
TOPSIS selects the most preferred alternative based on
its closeness to the most preferred outcome (zenith) and
distance from the least preferred outcome (nadir), using
a Euclidean distance metric in the n-dimensional scoring
space for criteria [3]. The proximity-to-zenith relationship
can be modeled by:
Ci∗ =
Ai−
(Ai∗ +Ai−)
. (3)
First, the normalized decision matrix R must is created to
transform each attributes score into a dimensionless metric
for comparison across attributes [23, Ch. III, §2.3.5]. When
yij is the scoring of asset Ai under criteria xj , the decision
matrix R is defined as:
R =

r11 r12 . . . r1n
r21 r22 . . . r2n
...
...
. . .
...
rm1 rm2 . . . rmn

where
rij =
yij√∑m
i=1 y
2
ij
.
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Using decision matrix R and weights w, we derive the
weighted normalized decision matrix V , as follows:
V =

v11 v12 . . . v1n
v21 v22 . . . v2n
...
...
. . .
...
vm1 vm2 . . . vmn

=

r11w1 r12w2 . . . r1nwn
r21w1 r22w2 . . . r2nwn
...
...
. . .
...
rm1w1 rm2w2 . . . rmnwn
 = R w .
The zenith, A∗, is the most preferable alternative available
within the system and is comprised of the most desirable
value of each asset over all the attributes. The nadir, A−,
is the least desirable and has the worst value of each asset
over all attributes. The Euclidean distance from zenith and
nadir is calculated for asset i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} as:
Ai∗ =
√√√√ n∑
j=1
(vij − v∗j )2 and Ai− =
√√√√ n∑
j=1
(vij − v−j )2
From Ai∗ and Ai− , the best feasible alternative Ci∗ can be
calculated from Eq. 3, and all the assets ranked by their
relative closeness to the zenith [3].
IV. CASE STUDY
Three key decision points for our study are defining the
missions relative to which families are pair-wise compared,
defining the criteria relative to which assets are scored,
and defining the assets comprising the system S that are
scored. We draw each mission M from existing doctrinal
definitions used by the Navy to prepare, provide, and employ
forces [24]. Criteria are derived from the Risk Management
Framework (RMF) objectives outlined in Federal and De-
partment of Defense security standards. Assets comprising
system S are routers, and their associated connected sub-
systems, for a representative US Navy ship-board industrial
control system.
A. Missions
The Maritime Operations Center Standardization Manual
provides fleet commanders with an organization and process
to bridge the gap between strategic guidance and tactical
execution [24]. It outlines six essential mission areas and
related supporting tasks. Our study selects three of these
mission areas, relative to which scoring is performed and
asset criticality is analyzed. These three missions, as defined
by Joint Publication 1-02, are:
Deterrence: The prevention of action by the exis-
tence of a credible threat of unacceptable coun-
teraction and/or belief that the cost of action
outweighs the perceived benefits.
Sea Control: Employment of forces to destroy en-
emy naval forces, suppress enemy sea commerce,
protect vital sea lanes, and establish local military
superiority in vital sea areas.
Power Projection: Conducting projection in the
maritime environment to include a broad spectrum
of military operations to destroy enemy forces
or logistic support or to prevent enemy forces
from approaching within enemy weapons range of
friendly forces. [5]
Each mission may require different configurations of
subsystems within S in order to successfully execute and
accomplish that mission. These missions were chosen to
provide three distinctly different system configurations.
B. Criteria
The criteria employed by our case study are given in
Table I. Our criteria are based on the definitions of confiden-
tiality, availability and integrity described in FIPS 199 [25]
and draws impact terminology from NIST’s Risk Manage-
ment Framework [26]. Criticality needs to reflect the impact
an attack may have on a compromised system with respect
to those subsystems directly connected to the target and to
subsystems that are indirectly connected (i.e., connected to
the same asset within a family versus connected to another
router within the family). Our study includes specific criteria
for resource redundancy, reflecting the military’s need to
survive through asset nonavailability to continue operations.
C. Assets
The target system S is an ethernet-connected multiplex
system comprised of multiple switches in a ring + 1 topology
with multiple independent backbones (see Fig. 3). Routers
are placed at the edge of the network with the backbones
being made of switches. We limit our case study to the sys-
tem’s routers because they are the layer 3 devices connecting
all major subsystem components in larger network.
subsystem	
1	
subsystem	
2	
subsystem	
3	
S	
R	 R	 R	 R	 R	
S	 S	 S	
S	
S	 S	 S	
Figure 3. A notional topology resembling our target system, highlighting
switches (S), routers (R) and subsystems.
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Table I
SECURITY CRITERIA.
Criteria Definition
Confidentiality to di-
rectly connected sys-
tems
If the target systems connected to the router
were compromised, then the resulting unau-
thorized disclosure of information held by
the target systems connected to that router
could be expected to have limited / serious /
severe or catastrophic adverse effect on or-
ganizational operations, organizational assets
or individuals.
Integrity to directly
connected systems
If the target systems connected to the router
were compromised, then the resulting modi-
fication or destruction of information held by
the target systems connected to that router
could be expected to have limited / serious /
severe or catastrophic adverse effect on or-
ganizational operations, organizational assets
or individuals.
Availability to directly
connected systems
If the target systems connected to the router
were compromised, then the resulting dis-
ruption of access to or use of information
held by the target systems connected to that
router could be expected to have limited /
serious / severe or catastrophic adverse effect
on organizational operations, organizational
assets or individuals.
Confidentiality to indi-
rectly connected sys-
tems
If the target systems connected to the router
were compromised, then the resulting unau-
thorized disclosure of information held by
systems connected to other routers could be
expected to have limited / serious / severe or
catastrophic adverse effect on organizational
operations, organizational assets or individu-
als.
Integrity to indirectly
connected systems
If the target systems connected to the router
were compromised, then the resulting unau-
thorized modification or destruction of infor-
mation held by systems connected to other
routers could be expected to have limited /
serious / severe or catastrophic adverse effect
on organizational operations, organizational
assets or individuals.
Availability to indi-
rectly connected sys-
tems
If the target systems connected to the router
were compromised, then the resulting disrup-
tion of access to or use of information held by
systems connected to other routers could be
expected to have limited / serious / severe or
catastrophic adverse effect on organizational
operations, organizational assets or individu-
als.
Resource redundancy
There are no / limited / multiple amount of
other systems to continue the same operation
if the system connected to the router is com-
promised.
Each router has multiple subsystems connected to it. A
subsystem deemed critical for a specific mission may carry
information with a low priority but a high criticality. The
categorization of systems in this manner allows for the
efficient use of limited data, toward the task of identifying
critical systems and assets within the ICS system with
respect to mission and operational parameters.
Given a network map for S, each router for a subsystem
can be scored against the criteria in Table I. The criteria are
scored on a three point Likert scale, with one being limited
and three being severe or catastrophic.
V. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In this section, we explore the results of applying our vari-
ant of TOPSIS methodology to our case study. As discussed
in Sec. III, we solicit SME feedback to weight criteria,
weight families and score assets. Typically, SME feedback
collected via the AHP yields a single set of weights, derived
via consensus. For our hierarchical variant, we solicit data
from three different groups of SMEs (four criteria SMEs,
four family SMEs, two asset SMEs) to derive a set of
SME scores. By exploring this “scoring space,” we intend to
assess the relative impact of this data on the final results of
the TOPSIS analysis and characterize the sensitivity of this
methodology in determining key cyber terrain. In particular,
it may be the case that one set of scores plays a much more
important role than the others, and effectively decides key
terrain in our case study.
For both family and criteria weighting, we expore three
strategies: random weights, a randomly-generated, artificial
weighting strategy; average weights, an average of all SME-
derived weightings; and transitive weights, the single SME-
derived weight demonstrating the best consistency ratio. As
defined by Saaty [22], the consistency ratio is an expres-
sion of how strongly transitive relationships hold among
weightings (i.e., a < b and b < c imples a < c), where
highly transitive behavior yields ratios less than 0.1. We
acknowledge, however, that inconsistency is not always bad
for pair-wise comparisons as it reflects the complexity of
real-world systems. For asset scoring, we explore two strate-
gies: informed scoring, derived through SME consensus; and
uniform scoring, an artificial score in which all assets are
scored the same (i.e., two on the 1–3 Likert scale).
In total, fifty-four possible analyses (i.e., 3 missions, 3
family weighting strategies, 3 criteria weighting strategies
and 2 asset scoring strategies) were compared to observe
the sensitivity of these factors and how they impact the
identification of key cyber terrain. For our analyses, we
identify “good” results to be those that appear to be highly
distinguishable, meaning they help establish distinguishing
criteria highlighting assets of high relative criticality. All
figures show more critical assets as having a higher “relative
closeness” (per Eq. 3). Assets with high criticality are
considered key cyber terrain. We leave exploring the possible
difference between critical assets and key cyber terrain to
future work.
Our observations are divided into three categories: the
effects of family weighting, the effects of asset scoring and
the effects of criteria weighting. Our preliminary analysis
focuses on three factors: impact, or the effect of weightings
and scoring; transitivity, or the effect of highly transitive
weights versus average weights; and perturbation, or the
effect of average weights versus random weights or, in
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the case of asset scoring, informed scoring versus uniform
scoring.
A. Impact of Family Weighting
For family weightings, we analyze the sensitivity of the
results under small of changes in weights. We look at overall
impact of family weights by observing the changes from
differences in family weightings. For 48 of 54 analyses, the
family weightings yield highly distinguishing results. The
6 analyses that we find not highly distinguishing are all
within one mission (power projection) using non-random
family weights; we suspect the relative closeness of family
weights under that mission depressed differences in criti-
cality. When analyzing perturbation, we compare pairs of
analyses employing average or random family weightings,
leading to 18 pairs of analyses. We observe, on average,
15 assets change in criticality1, or approximately 50% of
the total assets. This aligns with our expected behavior if
assets changed their criticality following a coin toss, and
shows that family weights indeed have an important role in
the outcome of the analysis. In particular, if asset scoring
dominates the outcome, we may not see this perturbation
when asset scoring is held constant. In looking at transi-
tivity, comparing highly transitive weightings (each time,
using SME weightings with the lowest consistency ratio)
to average weightings, leads to 18 pairs of analyses. Again,
we compare changes in criticality. For example, comparing
Figs. 4 and 5, we see three assets change in critical status and
three change in non-critical status. On average, across each
mission, we see between 4 and 9 assets change in criticality.
Given that completely random changes in criticality yield 15
assets changing position, we consider a change in 4–9 assets
to be quite sensitive to changes in family weightings.
In summary, we observe nearly all family weighting
strategies were distinguishing, i.e., even random weights
distinguish. This indicates that family weights may be in-
consequential and that other weighting strategies dominate
outcome; however, transitivity and perturbation analyses
suggest that family weights are consequential and should be
selected carefully. We observe that, given any fixed strategy
for asset scoring and criteria weighting, changes in family
weighting will perturb the key cyber terrain identified: for
each of our missions, between 17.2–31.0% assets change
position when comparing transitive vs. average strategies.
This sensitivity suggests that the family weightings for a
particular mission are highly distinguishable and highly
influential for the methodology in discriminating asset crit-
icality and key cyber terrain.
1In each analysis, assets are deemed either critical, non-critical or
neither (exceeding a non-criticality threshold, but not exceeding a criticality
threshold). We count assets that transition in their outcome: moving across
these thresholds. Thus, an asset that moves from non-critical to critical
would be counted as changing its criticality twice.
Figure 4. Asset criticality under the Deterrence Mission: average family
weighting, transitive criteria, and informed asset scoring.
Figure 5. Asset criticality under the Deterrence Mission: transitive family
weighting, transitive criteria, and informed asset scoring.
B. Impact of Asset Scoring
For assets, we analyze the impact and perturbation ef-
fects of scoring. When considering the impact of scoring,
informed scoring results are highly distinguishable for 23
of 27 analyses. For perturbation analysis, we compared
informed scores versus uniform scores: in 27 of 27 uniform
scoring analyses, the effect of criteria weighting was largely
minimized giving results that were predominantly based
on the family weightings. For example, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7
demonstrate different per-mission family weights, which
identify significantly different assets as critical. Varying
scoring strategy and holding other factors constant leads to
27 pairs of analyses, comparing uniform to informed asset
scoring. For 14 of these 27 pairs, uniform scoring results
in more assets to be deemed critical; uniform scoring never
resulted in fewer assets deemed critical, and never resulted in
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more assets deemed non-critical. For example, considering
a particular case within the power projection mission, six
more critical assets were identified (compare Fig. 7 with
Fig. 8). We conclude that uniform scoring produces more
conservative results, which makes sense since it employs
little judgement differentiating asset criticality. The value of
having conservative estimates, potentially yielding a larger
set of assets deemed critical, requires further study. Our
study does not attempt to conclude if a more conservative
approach to determining key cyber terrain is better or worse,
from a practical application standpoint.
Figure 6. Asset criticality under the Sea Control Mission: average family
weighting, transitive criteria, and uniform asset scoring.
Figure 7. Asset criticality under the Power Projection Mission: average
family weighting, transitive criteria, and uniform asset scoring.
C. Impact of Criteria Weighting
The sensitivity of results to criteria weights was analyzed
to determine effect on key cyber terrain. We explore the
Figure 8. Asset criticality under the Power Projection Mission: average
family weighting, transitive criteria, and informed asset scoring.
effect of perturbation for criteria weighting, comparing ran-
dom with average criteria weighting—while holding other
factors constant, using only non-random family weighting
and informed asset scores2—yields 6 pairs of analyses (i.e.,
three missions, two family weightings, informed scoring).
Across these 6, we observe an average of 2 assets change
criticality (6.9% of all assets); excluding one case (power
projection mission with average family weightings under
informed scoring), this average is significantly lowered: 0.83
assets (2.9% of all assets). Thus, either outcomes exhibit
low-sensitivity to criteria weights, or average criteria weights
are effectively random. In fact, we do observe high vari-
ance among SME-derived weighting: the largest difference
between derived single criteria weightings is 0.3027. We
expected, given our use of AHP, to be unable to achieve total
consensus on what security criteria are most important for
key cyber terrain; but there were few similarities in criteria
weighting to suggest even the general importance of each
criteria.
We find similar trends when analyzing the effect of
transitivity for criteria weighting—i.e., employing the most
transitive weights while holding other factors constant, as
before—again, yielding 6 pairs of analyses. Across these 6
comparisons, we observe an average of 0.5 assets change
criticality (1.7% of all assets), demonstrating that outcomes
show low-sensitivity to transitivity in criteria weighting.
This extremely low effect with highly transitive weights
suggests that outcomes are more significantly decided by
family weighting and asset scoring strategies, and see little
difference among highly transitive, average or random crite-
ria weighting strategies. Qualitatively, however, it appears
2We exclude random family weighting and uniform asset scoring, as
we have previously remarked the effects of these, i.e., random changes
to asset criticality or more conservative determination of asset criticality,
respectively.
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that highly transitive weights yield simpler to interpret
distinguishing criteria among critical and non-critical assets;
we leave fuller characterization of this observation to future
work.
Given the apparent low sensitivity of criteria weights, we
explore the magnitude of effect of criteria weights compared
to family weights. We conduct our analyses by observing
the change in the number of critical assets when the family
weighting strategy is changed and criteria weighting strategy
is held constant (i.e., average, transitive, and random criteria
weighting strategy under informed scoring when family
weighting is most transitive or average), and the number
of critical assets when the criteria weighting strategy is
changed and family weighting strategy is held constant (i.e.,
average, transitive, and random family weighting strategy
under informed scoring when criteria weighting is most
transitive or average). This leads to two sets of 18 analysis
pairs: in one set, family weighting strategy is varied and in
the other, criteria weighting strategy is varied. When looking
at the family weighting strategies, we observe an average of
about 7 assets change criticality (23.7% of all assets); when
criteria weighting strategies change, we observe an average
of less than one asset changes criticality (1.1% of all assets).
As illustrated in Figs. 4 and 5, six assets changed criticality
when family weighting strategy changed. In comparison, as
shown in Figs. 4 and 9, only two assets changed criticality
when criteria weighting changed3. This large difference in
number of assets changing criticality suggests that family
weightings have about 20 times larger effect on the outcomes
in identifying key cyber terrain than do criteria weighting in
the context of our case study.
Figure 9. Asset criticality under the Deterrence Mission: average family
weighting, average criteria, and informed asset scoring.
3Note: This particular comparison had the largest number of critical
asset changes when the criteria weighting strategy changed. Only one
other comparison had any assets change criticality with the remaining
comparisons having zero changes in critical assets.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our application of hierarchical TOPSIS yields insight into
the cyber-physical key terrain aboard a US Navy vessel
required for the successful conduct of various missions. The
methodology used here suggests that critical assets’ partici-
pation in key cyber terrain can be identified and does change
according to mission. The impact of our findings means that
cyber situational awareness should account for mission. As
a result, we conclude that any cyber situational awareness
tool must account for the changes in the operational use of
a system while operating under different missions.
Within the context of our case study, our observations
suggest the most important factor in determining key cyber
terrain is in defining family weights for a particular mission.
Once per-mission family weights are determined, then the
key cyber terrain derived from the methodology used here
will closely mirror those weights. Our observations suggest
that criteria weights are dramatically less important than
family weights. When assets are scored uniformly, key cyber
terrain appears to be identified in a more conservative and
less informed manner.
An important corollary of our research in practical ap-
plication is that identifying key cyber terrain will allow
scarce resources to be prioritized to critical systems during
operation. Further work is needed to demonstrate that terrain
prioritization benefits situational awareness because it allows
focus on the health and performance of key assets without
distraction from system components that do not impact
mission performance. Similarly, further work may show that
terrain prioritization allows the use of tailored analytics
and limited defensive resources to focus on monitoring and
protecting infrastructure essential to the success of the ship.
A. Future Work
Further work is required to validate the soundness of
the results obtained using this methodology, i.e., that assets
identified as contributing to key cyber terrain are the same as
those identified as integral in attack and vulnerability studies
for the target system. This could be done by overlaying
known vulnerabilities with critical assets to better identify
the possible impact to missions and effect on key cyber
terrain, or compare our study with other methodologies
to determine the differences in identification of key cyber
terrain. It would be interesting to explore the high SME-
response variance we observed. In fact, no formal survey
work has been conducted to elicit family and criteria weight-
ings, so no reserch exists to guide selecting a sample size
to achieve statistical significance. Exploring how to elicit
pairwise rankings with confidence in the statistical properties
of the derived weights would be a valuable contribution,
allowing future research to avoid the costly process of
achieving consensus-derived weights.
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